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Abstract
Psychologists recognize Raven’s Progressive Matrices as a
very effective test of general human intelligence. While many
computational models have been developed by the AI com-
munity to investigate different forms of top-down, deliber-
ative reasoning on the test, there has been less research on
bottom-up perceptual processes, like Gestalt image comple-
tion, that are also critical in human test performance. In this
work, we investigate how Gestalt visual reasoning on the
Raven’s test can be modeled using generative image inpaint-
ing techniques from computer vision. We demonstrate that a
self-supervised inpainting model trained only on photorealis-
tic images of objects achieves a score of 27/36 on the Colored
Progressive Matrices, which corresponds to average perfor-
mance for nine-year-old children. We also show that mod-
els trained on other datasets (faces, places, and textures) do
not perform as well. Our results illustrate how learning visual
regularities in real-world images can translate into success-
ful reasoning about artificial test stimuli. On the flip side, our
results also highlight the limitations of such transfer, which
may explain why intelligence tests like the Raven’s are often
sensitive to people’s individual sociocultural backgrounds.
Introduction
Consider the matrix reasoning problem in Figure 1; the goal
is to select the answer choice from the bottom that best fits in
the blank portion on top. Such problems are found on many
different human intelligence tests (Roid and Miller 1997;
Wechsler 2008), including on the Raven’s Progressive Ma-
trices tests, which are considered to be the most effective
single measure of general intelligence across all psychome-
tric tests (Snow, Kyllonen, and Marshalek 1984).
As you may have guessed, the solution to this problem
is answer choice #2. While this problem may seem quite
simple, what is interesting about it is that there are multiple
ways to solve it. For example, one might take a top-down,
deliberative approach by first deciding that the top two el-
ements are reflected across the horizontal axis, and then
reflecting the bottom element to predict an answer–often
called an Analytic approach (Lynn, Allik, and Irwing 2004;
Prabhakaran et al. 1997). Alternatively, one might just “see”
1Present affiliation: China University of Geosciences, Beijing.
Figure 1: Example problem like those on the Raven’s Pro-
gressive Matrices tests (Kunda, McGreggor, and Goel 2013).
the answer emerge in the empty space, in a more bottom-up,
automatic fashion–often called a Gestalt or figural approach.
While many computational models explore variations of
the Analytic approach, less attention has been paid to the
Gestalt approach, though both are critical in human intelli-
gence. In human cognition, Gestalt principles refer to a di-
verse set of capabilities for detecting and predicting percep-
tual regularities such as symmetry, closure, similarity, etc.
(Wagemans et al. 2012). Here, we investigate how Gestalt
reasoning on the Raven’s test can be modeled with genera-
tive image inpainting techniques from computer vision:
• We describe a concrete framework for solving Raven’s
problems through Gestalt visual reasoning, using a
generic image inpainting model as a component.
• We demonstrate that our framework, using an inpainting
model trained on photorealistic object images from Ima-
geNet, achieves a score of 27/36 on the Raven’s Colored
Progressive Matrices test.
• We show that test performance is sensitive to the inpaint-
ing model’s training data. Models trained on faces, places,
and textures get scores of 11, 17, and 18, respectively, and
we offer some potential reasons for these differences.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
91
1.
07
73
6v
2 
 [c
s.C
V]
  2
6 N
ov
 20
19
Figure 2: Images eliciting Gestalt “completion” phenomena.
Background: Gestalt Reasoning
In humans, Gestalt phenomena have to do with how we in-
tegrate low-level perceptual elements into coherent, higher-
level wholes (Wagemans et al. 2012). For example, the left
side of Figure 2 contains only scattered line segments, but
we inescapably see a circle and rectangle. The right side of
Figure 2 contains one whole key and one broken key, but we
see two whole keys with occlusion.
In psychology, studies of Gestalt phenomena have enu-
merated a list of principles (or laws, perceptual/reasoning
processes, etc.) that cover the kinds of things that human
perceptual systems do (Wertheimer 1923; Kanizsa 1979).
Likewise, work in image processing and computer vision
has attempted to define these principles mathematically or
computationally (Desolneux, Moisan, and Morel 2007).
In more recent models, Gestalt principles are seen as
emergent properties that reflect, rather than determine, per-
ceptions of structure in an agent’s visual environment. For
example, early approaches to image inpainting—i.e., recon-
structing a missing/degraded part of an image—used rule-
like principles to determine the structure of missing content,
while later, machine-learning-based approaches attempt to
learn structural regularities from data and apply them to new
images (Scho¨nlieb 2015). This seems reasonable as a model
of Gestalt phenomena in human cognition; after years of ex-
perience with the world around us, we see Figure 2 (left) as
partially occluded/degraded views of whole objects.
Background: Image Inpainting
Machine-learning-based inpainting techniques typically ei-
ther borrow information from within the occluded image
itself (Bertalmio et al. 2000; Barnes et al. 2009; Ulyanov,
Vedaldi, and Lempitsky 2018) or from a prior learned
from other images (Hays and Efros 2008; Yu et al. 2018;
Zheng, Cham, and Cai 2019). The first type of approach of-
ten uses patch similarities to propagate low-level features,
such as the texture of grass, from known background regions
to unknown patches. Of course, such approaches suffer on
images with low self-similarity or when the missing part in-
volves semantic-level cognition, e.g., a part of a face.
The second approach aims to generalize regularities in vi-
sual content and structure across different images, and sev-
eral impressive results have recently been achieved with the
rise of deep-learning-based generative models. For exam-
ple, Li and colleagues (2017) use an encoder-decoder neural
network structure, regulated by an adversarial loss function,
to recover partly occluded face images. More recently, Yu
and colleagues (2018) designed an architecture that not only
can synthesize missing image parts but also explicitly uti-
lizes surrounding image feature as context to make inpaint-
ing more precise. In general, most recent neural-network-
based image inpainting algorithms represent some combina-
tion of variational autoencoders (VAE) and generative ad-
versarial networks (GAN) and typically contain an encoder,
a decoder, and an adversarial discriminator.
Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN) Generative
adversarial networks combine generative and discriminative
models to learn very robust image priors (Goodfellow et al.
2014). In a typical formulation, the generator is a transposed
convolutional neural network while the discriminator is a
regular convolutional neural network. During training, the
generator is fed random noise and outputs a generated im-
age. The generated image is sent alongside a real image to
the discriminator, which outputs a score to evaluate how real
or fake the inputs are. The error between the output score and
ground truth score is back-propagated to adjust the weights.
This training scheme forces the generator to produce im-
ages that will fool the discriminator into believing they are
real images. In the end, training converges at an equilib-
rium where the generator cannot make the synthesized im-
age more real, while the discriminator fails to tell whether an
image is real or generated. Essentially, the training process
of GANs forces the generated images to lay within the same
distribution (in some latent space) as real images.
Variational autoencoders (VAE) Autoencoders are deep
neural networks, with a narrow bottleneck layer in the mid-
dle, that can reconstruct high dimensional data from original
inputs. The bottleneck will capture a compressed latent en-
coding that can then be used for tasks other than reconstruc-
tion. Variational autoencoders use a similar encoder-decoder
structure but also encourage continuous sampling within the
bottleneck layer so that the decoder, once trained, functions
as a generator (Kingma and Welling 2013).
VAE-GAN While a GAN’s generated image outputs are
often sharp and clear, a major disadvantage is that the train-
ing process can be unstable and prone to problems (Goodfel-
low et al. 2014; Mao et al. 2016). Even if training problems
can be solved, e.g., (Arjovsky, Chintala, and Bottou 2017),
GANs still lack encoders that map real images to latent vari-
ables. Compared with GANs, VAE-generated images are of-
ten a bit blurrier, but the model structure in general is much
more mathematically elegant and more easily trainable. To
get the best of both worlds, Larsen and colleagues (2015)
proposed an architecture that attaches an adversarial loss to
a variational autoencoder, as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Architecture of VAE-GAN
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Our Gestalt Reasoning Framework
In this section, we present a general framework for mod-
eling Gestalt visual reasoning on the Raven’s test or similar
types of problems. Our framework is intended to be agnostic
to any type of encoder-decoder-based inpainting model. For
our experiments, we adopt a recent VAE-GAN inpainting
model (Yu et al. 2018); as we use the identical architecture
and training configuration, we refer readers to the original
paper for more details about the inpainting model itself.
Our framework makes use of a pre-trained encoder Fθ
and corresponding decoder Gφ (where θ and φ indicate the
encoder’s and decoder’s learned parameters, respectively).
The partially visible image to be inpainted, in our case, is
a Raven’s problem matrix with the fourth cell missing, ac-
companied with a mask, which is passed as input into the
encoder F . Then F outputs an embedded feature represen-
tation f , which is sent as input to the generator G. Note that
the learned feature representation f could be of any form—
a vector, matrix, tensor or any other encoding as long as it
represents the latent features of input images.
The generator then outputs a generated image, and we cut
out the generated part as the predicted answer. Finally, we
choose the most similar candidate answer choice by com-
puting the L2 distance among feature representations of the
various images (the prediction versus each answer choice),
computed using the trained encoder F again.
This process is illustrated in Figure 4. More concisely, let
x1, x2, x3, be the three elements of the original problem ma-
trix, m be the image mask, and X be the input comprised of
these four images. Then, the process of solving the problem
to determine the chosen answer y can be written as:
y = argmin
k∈S
∥∥∥∥∥Fθ
(
(Gφ(Fθ(X))ij) h
2<i≤h
w
2 <j≤w
)
− Fθ(ak)
∥∥∥∥∥
where h and w are height and width of the reconstructed
image, and S is the answer choice space.
Raven’s Test Materials
All Raven’s problem images were taken from scans of offi-
cial test booklets (Raven, Raven, and Court 1998). We con-
ducted experiments using two versions of the test: the Stan-
dard Progressive Matrices (SPM), intended for the general
population, and the Colored Progressive Matrices (CPM),
which is an easier test for children and lower-ability adults.
In fact, these two tests have substantial overlap: the CPM
contains three sets labeled A, AB, and B, with 12 problems
 x1  x2
 x3
 m
 Fθ
 Gϕ
 x′ 1  x′ 2
 x′ 3  x′ 4
 x′ 1  x′ 2
 x′ 3  x′ 4  x′ 4
 a5
 a4
 a3
 a2
 a1
 x′ 4
 a6
 f
 fx′  4
 fa1
 fa6
 L2
  fx′  4 − fa1
  fx′  4 − fa2
  fx′  4 − fa3
  fx′  4 − fa4
  fx′  4 − fa5
  fx′  4 − fa6
 arg min  Answer
Figure 4: Reasoning framework for solving Raven’s test problems using Gestalt image completion, using any pre-trained
encoder-decoder-based image inpainting model. Elements x1, x2, and x3 from the problem matrix form the initial input, com-
bined into a single image, along with a mask m that indicates the missing portion. These are passed through the encoder Fθ,
and the resulting image features f in latent variable space are passed into the decoder Gφ. This creates a new complete matrix
image X ′; the portion x′4 corresponding to the masked location is the predicted answer to the problem. This predicted answer
x′4, along with all of the answer choices ai, are again passed through the encoder Fθ to obtain feature representations in latent
space, and the answer choice most similar to x′4 is selected as the final solution.
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Figure 5: Examples of inpainting produced by same VAE-GAN model (Yu et al. 2018) trained on four different datasets. Left
to right: ImageNet (objects), CelebA (faces), Places (scenes), and DTD (textures).
each, and the SPM contains five sets labeled A-E also with
12 problems each. Sets A and B are shared across the two
tests. Problems increase in difficulty within and across sets.
Initial experiments showed that the inpainting models of-
ten failed to work when there was significant white space
around the missing element, as in the problem in Figure 1.
Thus, when we fed in the matrix images as a combined sin-
gle image, as in Figure 4, we cropped out this white space.
This did change the appearance of problems somewhat, es-
sentially squeezing together the elements in the matrix.
Inpainting Models
For our experiments, we used the same image inpainting
model (Yu et al. 2018) trained on four different datasets.
The first model, which we call Model-Objects, we trained
from scratch so that we could evaluate Raven’s test perfor-
mance at multiple checkpoints during training. The latter
three models, which we call Model-Faces, Model-Scenes,
and Model-Textures, we obtained as pre-trained models (Yu
et al. 2018). Details about each dataset are given below.
Note: The reader may wonder why we did not train an in-
painting model on Raven’s-like images, i.e., black and white
illustrations of 2D shapes. Our rationale follows the spirit
of human intelligence testing: people are not meant to prac-
tice taking Raven’s-like problems. If they do, the test is no
longer a valid measure of their intelligence (Hayes, Petrov,
and Sederberg 2015). Here, our goal was to explore how
“test-naive” Gestalt image completion processes would fare.
(There are many more nuances to these ideas, of course,
which we discuss further in Related Work.)
Model-Objects. The first model, Model-Objects, was
trained on the Imagenet dataset (Russakovsky et al. 2015).
We trained this model from scratch. We began with the full
ImageNet dataset containing ∼14M images non-uniformly
spanning 20,000 categories such as “windows,” “balloons,”
and “giraffes. The model converged prior to one full training
epoch on the randomized dataset; we halted training around
300,000 iterations, with a batch size of 36 images per iter-
ation. The best Raven’s performance was found at around
80,000 iterations, which means that the final model we used
saw only about ∼3M images in total during training.
Model-Faces. Our second model, Model-Faces, was
trained on the Large-scale CelebFaces Attributes (CelebA)
dataset (Liu et al. 2015), which contains around 200,000 im-
ages of celebrity faces, covering around 10,000 individuals.
Model-Scenes. Our third model, Model-Scenes, was
trained on the Places dataset (Zhou et al. 2017), which con-
tains around 10M images spanning 434 categories, grouped
into three macro-categories: indoor, nature, and urban.
Model-Textures. Our fourth model, Model-Textures, was
trained on the Describable Textures Dataset (DTD) (Cimpoi
et al. 2014), which contains 5640 images, divided into 47
categories, of textures taken from real objects, such as knit-
ting patterns, spiderwebs, or an animal’s skin.
Figure 6: Image inpainting loss (top) and CPM performance
(bottom) during training of Model-Objects.
Results
Figure 6 shows results over training time for Model-Objects.
The top plot shows the loss function that is being trained for
image inpainting; the model seems to settle into a minimum
around 200,000 iterations. The bottom plot shows CPM per-
formance as a function of training, divided into sets A, AB,
and B. The model relatively quickly rises above chance per-
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Figure 7: Results for each model on each set of the Raven’s
CPM (A, AB, and B) and SPM (A-E).
formance, which would be an expected score of 6 in total
(from 36 problems each having 6 answer choices).
In fact, we noticed that the randomly initialized model ac-
tually appears to do a bit better than chance; after numerous
runs, the average starting score was around 8/36. We believe
this can be attributed to intrinsic structure-capturing abili-
ties of the convolutional neural network structure (Ulyanov,
Vedaldi, and Lempitsky 2018).
After ∼80,000 iterations, CPM performance does not
change other than local variations. For the rest of our analy-
ses, we used the model snapshot at the point when it reached
peak performance of 27/36 correct. While this yields an op-
timistic estimate of performance, we chose this approach in
keeping with our goal of investigating what sort of Gestalt
transfer would even be possible using a model that had never
seen Raven’s problems before.
Now we compare results across the four models: Model-
Objects trained as above, and pre-trained versions of Model-
Faces, Model-Scenes, and Model-Textures.
Figure 7 shows scores achieved by each of the four mod-
els on each of the six sets of Raven’s problems. As seen
in this plot, Model-Objects performs better than any of
the other models overall, though Model-Textures does a
smidgeon better on Set A (which contains very texture-like
problems, so this result makes sense).
None of the models do very well on sets C or D, per-
forming essentially at chance (these problems have 8 an-
swer choices, so chance ∼1.5 correct. Interestingly, Model-
Objects was the only one that consistently generated an-
swers to all problems; the other three models often generated
blank images to problems in sets C and D. We are not sure
why this occurred. All of the models do rather surprisingly
well on set E, which is supposed to be the hardest set of all.
Figure 8 shows values called “score discrepancies.” When
a person takes a Raven’s test, the examiner is supposed to
check the per-set composition of their score against norma-
tive data from other people who got the same total score. So,
for example, a score of 27 on the CPM has norms of 10, 10,
and 7 for sets A, AB, and B, respectively, which is exactly
what Model-Objects scored. (This is why there are no blue
bars appearing in the CPM portion of this plot.) This means
that Model-Objects was essentially subject to the same dif-
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Figure 8: Per-set score discrepancies between each model
and human norms for same total scores on CPM and SPM.
ficulty distribution as other people taking the test.
In contrast, if we look at the SPM results, the models do
worse than they should have on sets C and D, and better
than they should have on set E. This means that the difficulty
distributions experiences by the models are not the same as
what people typically experience.
Figure 9 shows examples of Model-Objects results from
various sample problems. (Actual Raven’s problems are not
shown, in order to protect test security.) Some results are
surprisingly good, given that the model was only trained on
real-world color photographs.
Interestingly, when we inspected results from the Raven’s
test, the model generates what look like poor image guesses
for certain problems, for example on some of the more dif-
ficult problems in set E, but then still chooses the correct
answer choice. This could be some form of lucky informed
guessing, or, it could be that the image representations in la-
tent space are actually capturing some salient features of the
problem and solution.
Discussion and Related Work
Over the decades, there have been many exciting efforts in
AI to computationally model various aspects of problem
solving for Raven’s matrix reasoning and similar geomet-
ric analogy problems, beginning with Evans’ classic ANAL-
OGY program (Evans 1968). In this section, we review some
major themes that seem to have emerged across these ef-
forts, situate our current work within this broader context,
and point out important gaps that remain unfilled.
Note that our discussion does not focus heavily on ab-
solute test scores. Raven’s is not now (and probably never
will be) a task that is of practical utility for AI systems in
the world to be solving well, and so treating it as a black-
box benchmark is of limited value. However, the test has
been and continues to be enormously profitable as a research
tool for generating insights into the organization of intelli-
gence, both in humans and in artificial systems. We feel that
the more valuable scientific knowledge from computational
studies of Raven’s problem solving has come from system-
atic, within-model experiments, which is also our aim here.
Knowledge-based versus data-driven. Early models
took a knowledge-based approach, meaning that they con-
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Figure 9: Images generated using Model-Objects for a variety of Raven’s-like sample problems.
tained explicit, structured representations of certain key el-
ements of domain knowledge. For example, Carpenter and
colleagues (1990) built a system that matched relationships
among problem elements according to one of five predefined
rules. Knowledge-based models tend to focus on what an
agent does with its knowledge during reasoning (Rasmussen
and Eliasmith 2011; Kunda, McGreggor, and Goel 2013;
Strannega˚rd, Cirillo, and Stro¨m 2013; Lovett and Forbus
2017); where this knowledge might come from remains an
open question.
On the flip side, a recently emerging crop of data-driven
models extract domain knowledge from a training set con-
taining example problems that are similar to the test prob-
lems the model will eventually solve (Hoshen and Werman
2017; Barrett et al. 2018; Hill et al. 2019; Steenbrugge et al.
2018; van Steenkiste et al. 2019; Zhang et al. 2019). Data-
driven models tend to focus on interactions between train-
ing data, learning architectures, and learning outcomes; how
knowledge might be represented in a task-general manner
and used flexibly during reasoning and decision-making re-
main open questions.
Our model of Gestalt visual reasoning falls into an inter-
esting grey area between these two camps. On the one hand,
the model represents Gestalt principles implicitly, as image
priors in some latent space, and these priors are learned in
a data-driven fashion. On the other hand, unlike all of the
above data-driven models, our model does not train on any-
thing resembling Raven’s problems. In that sense, it is closer
to a knowledge-based model in that we can investigate how
knowledge learned in one setting (image inpainting) can be
applied to reason about very different inputs.
Constructive matching versus response elimination.
Another interesting divide among Raven’s models has to do
with the overall problem-solving strategy. A study of hu-
man problem solving on geometric analogy problems found
that people generally use one of two strategies: they come
up with a predicted answer first, and then compare it to
the answer choices—constructive matching—or they men-
tally plug each answer choice into the matrix and choose the
best one—response elimination (Bethell-Fox, Lohman, and
Snow 1984).
Knowledge-based models have come in both varieties; all
of the data-driven models follow the response-elimination
approach. Our model uses constructive matching, which we
feel is an interesting capability given that the system is not
doing any deliberative reasoning (per se) about what should
go in the blank space.
Open issues. Our Gestalt model certainly has limita-
tions, as illustrated in the results section. (See Figure 10 for
another example.) However, our investigations highlight a
form of human reasoning that has not been explored in pre-
vious Raven’s models. How are Gestalt principles learned,
and how do specific types of visual experiences contribute
to a person’s sensitivity to regularities like symmetry or clo-
sure?
Figure 10: Model-Objects performing inpainting on a row of
windows, with the original image on the left, the masked im-
age in the center, and the inpainted image on the right. Note
the phantom reflection in the inpainted image. This type of
relational, commonsense reasoning requires going beyond a
purely Gestalt approach.
One fascinating direction for future work will be to ex-
plore these relationships in more detail, and perhaps shed
light on cultural factors in intelligence testing. For example,
would a model trained only on urban scenes (which con-
tain lots of corners, perfect symmetries, and straight lines)
do better on Raven’s problems than a model trained only on
nature scenes?
Finally, two major open issues for AI models of intelli-
gence tests in general are: metacognitive strategy selection,
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and task learning. Most AI models tend to adopt a single
strategy and see how far its performance can be pushed.
However, for humans, a major part of the challenge of in-
telligence testing is figuring out what strategy to use when,
and being able to adapt and switch strategies as needed.
In the context of our work, we aim to integrate our
Gestalt approach with other, more deliberative reasoning ap-
proaches to begin to address this issue. This will introduce
many challenges related to having to determine confidence
in an answer, planning and decision making, etc.
Relatedly, as with many tasks and systems in AI, previous
work on Raven’s and other intelligence tests has required
the AI system designers to specify the task, its format, goal,
etc. for the system. Humans sit down and are given verbal or
demonstration-based instructions, and must learn the task,
how to represent it internally, and how and what procedures
to try. This kind of task learning (Laird et al. 2017) remains
a key challenge for AI research in intelligence testing.
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